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Abstract. The paper discusses the issue whether art and works of art created by artists can be assessed using legal 
means. The paper provides an overview of the different Hungarian constitutional provisions governing artistic 
freedom from 1949 to the present, and examines the possible components of freedom of arts as a fundamental 
right, within the confines of the Hungarian legal system. According to the author, the subjective side of the artistic 
freedom integrates into the fundamental right of freedom of expression, ie artistic expression is free, but it does not 
require a separate, specific protection under constitutional law. However, the specificities of artistic expression as 
factors influencing the scope of the freedom of expression might be taken into account, e.g. symbolic speech, the 
specificities of a genre or the time elapsed since publication). Hence, works of art and literary pieces are to be 
treated as specific, unique forms of opinions – they are presented as a form of freedom of expression but this does 
not go beyond the boundaries of freedom of expression as a fundamental right. At the same time, the regulation of 
art, irrespective of this, might be justified even in the Fundamental Law. Setting requirements for the state (the 
objective obligation of the state to safeguard the institutions of fundamental law) is a precondition for the birth and 
preservation of works of art, which constitutes the objective side of artistic freedom without any specific subject 
and denotes its specific constitutional content But, an appropriate level of protection for freedom of expression 
ensures that this recognition should not have any detrimental consequences for freedom of arts.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Can art and works of art created by artists be assessed using legal means? Is it possible for 
works of art, which embody the greatest achievements of the human spirit and through 
which each era defines its own culture, to be judged by the law, a deliberately down-to-
earth, technical set of rules which aims to settle great or small disputes between citizens or 
between citizens and the state?
The scope of individual freedom today is broader than ever before during the history 
of mankind especially when it comes to issues of morality and freedom of opinion and as 
such, artists and writers living under the legal systems of the Western World face few 
serious or persistent challenges. Nevertheless, it is still true that certain general legal norms 
still apply to works of art, even though greater freedom is allowed to the individual than 
ever before. In this paper, it will be argued that this is not necessarily a problem. The 
‘absorption’ of artistic freedom into the fundamental right of freedom of expression and the 
simultaneous acknowledgement of the lack of any need to protect it separately, were 
unavoidable for many reasons. At the same time, an appropriate level of protection for 
freedom of expression ensures that this recognition should not have any detrimental 
consequences for freedom of arts, which, aside from constitutional terminology or the 
doctrines surrounding fundamental rights, is surely one of the most important achievements 
and values of our civilisation.
Section 2 provides an overview of the different Hungarian constitutional provisions 
governing artistic freedom from 1949 to the present, while section 3 examines the possible 
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components of freedom of arts as a fundamental right, within the confines of the Hungarian 
legal system. The paper ends in with some conclusions in section 4.
2. REGULATION OF ARTISTIC FREEDOM UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
Article 53 of the first fundamental law of Hungary, the Constitution of 1949, stipulated that 
‘the Hungarian People’s Republic provides effective support … to art depicting the life and 
struggles of the people, reality and celebrating the victory of the people’. The original 
wording of the constitution thus failed to mention artistic freedom, instead prescribing the 
State’s commitment to support an ideologically restricted category of artworks.1
Article 60 of the Constitution was amended, as a result of the constitutional reform 
implemented by Act I of 1972, to include the right to artistic freedom (the ‘Hungarian 
People’s Republic ensures the freedom of academic and artistic activities’) although the 
state’s supporting activity remained in the text (namely in Article 18), in a similarly narrow 
scope: ‘the Hungarian People’s Republic … helps art in the service of progress’.
Article 70/G of the Constitution (added following the end of the communist regime in 
Hungary), that was in force until 2012, expressly provided for the freedom of ‘artistic life’, 
together with that of ‘scientific life’, in line with democratic requirements:
1) The Republic of Hungary shall respect and support the freedom of scientific and 
artistic life, the freedom of learning and of teaching.
2) Only scientists shall be entitled to decide on questions of scientific truth and to 
determine the scientific value of research.
Since 2012, Article X of the Fundamental Law is similar in content, albeit using 
different, somewhat more loquacious terminology declaring the freedom of ‘artistic 
creation’ (as well as of ‘scientific research’). The only real change is that the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences and the Hungarian Academy of Arts (a formerly private association 
transformed into a public body) were granted constitutional rank.
1) Hungary shall ensure the freedom of scientific research and artistic creation, the 
freedom of learning for the acquisition of the highest possible level of knowledge and 
the freedom of teaching within the framework determined by law.
2) The State shall not be entitled to decide on questions of scientific truth and scientists 
shall have the exclusive right to evaluate any scientific research.
3) Hungary shall defend the scientific and artistic freedom of the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences and the Hungarian Academy of Arts. All institutions of higher education 
shall be autonomous in terms of the contents and methodology of research and teaching 
and their organisations and financial management shall be regulated by a special 
Act. The Government shall, within the framework of an Act, lay down the rules 
governing the management of public higher education institutions and shall supervise 
their  management.
It is primarily the Constitutional Court’s (Alkotmánybíróság, abbreviated as AB when 
referring to its resolutions) decisions that provide some guidance regarding the place and 
1 Láncos (2009) 2608.
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content of freedom of arts within the system of fundamental rights. Constitutional Court 
decision no 30/1992. (V 26.) AB, primarily dealing with the criminal law assessment of 
hate speech, placed artistic freedom into the subcategory of ‘communications-related 
fundamental rights’, as an independent fundamental right stemming from freedom of 
expression, the latter being a ‘mother right’.
[T]he freedom of expression has a special place among constitutional fundamental 
rights. In effect it is the ‘mother right’ of several freedoms, the fundamental rights of 
‘communication’. The rights named as deriving from this ‘mother right’ are the right to 
free speech and the right to the freedom of the press, with the latter encompassing the 
freedom of all media, as well as the right to be informed and the right to obtain 
information freely. In a broader sense, freedom of expression includes artistic and 
literary freedoms, the freedom to distribute and disseminate works of art, the freedom 
of scientific research and the freedom to teach scientific knowledge.2
Constitutional Court decision no 24/1996. (VI. 25.) AB expressly focused on artistic 
freedom. The Constitutional Court annulled certain provisions of a Council of Ministers 
Decree of 1982, which ruled that business entities, non-governmental organisations and 
organisations without legal personality could only acquire, use or market works of art after 
the work concerned had been assessed in terms of its artistic merits, which clearly violated 
the freedom of artistic life. The Constitutional Court stated
According to the position taken by the Constitutional Court, the freedom of artistic 
life, as a fundamental right, also includes the freedom of artistic creative work, the 
self-expression of the artist, free from any illicit restriction, as well as the freedom to 
display, present and distribute the works of art to the public … As an inherent 
characteristic of art, the work of art is usually intended for and aimed by its author at 
the public (ie the audience). Hence, any regulation aiming to restrict access to the 
works of art jeopardises the freedom of artistic life. Based on the above outlined 
considerations, the core content of the freedom of artistic life lies in the right to pursue 
artistic creative work free from any kind of power-based influence, to express the 
opinion embodied in the work of art freely and hence to publish and present the works 
of art to the public.3
The requirement stating that works of art can be acquired (marketed, used) only after 
their assessment in terms of their artistic merits constitutes a violation of the general 
freedom of action.4
3. FREEDOM OF ARTS AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
3.1. Regulations Governing Art
Without a doubt, the State does have certain regulatory duties, which may be stated even in 
the Constitution. For example, copyright regulations are essential for the creation of artistic 
2 Statement of Reasons, s III.2.1.
3 Statement of Reasons, s II.1.
4 Statement of Reasons, s II.2. 
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or literary works. Similarly, the organisation of arts training and education is primarily a 
state duty, as is the financing of museums, exhibition spaces, etc.
The state has a twofold role in connection with the arts. One is being the obligor of 
fundamental rights, it must refrain from any interference in artistic freedom. The other is 
that it has a positive obligation to finance the network of institutions which promote the 
creation of works of art as well as to carry out direct sponsorship (patronage) activity. 
Accordingly, artistic freedom, as a fundamental right, is a Janus-faced freedom. On the one 
hand it is a classic civil liberty, where the artist (writer) is the rights holder while the State 
is obliged to refrain from interfering and on the other hand, artistic freedom requires the 
active participation by the state in the field of artistic life.
3.2. The Need for the State’s Participation, Involvement and Commitment in the Arts
3.2.1. The State’s Obligation of Objective Institutional Protection
The theory of ‘the obligation of objective institutional protection’ has been shaped by the 
practice of the Constitutional Court in Hungary. The Constitutional Court, in decision no 
64/1991. (XII. 17.) AB, passed in the second year of its operation, laid down the following 
principles:
[D]ue to the different aspects and duties of the rights holder of the fundamental right 
and of the state, the subjective right and the objective side of this fundamental right do 
not necessarily overlap. The state, as a result of its general and objective considerations, 
may define the scope of objective, institutional protection of the same fundamental 
right beyond the scope of protection afforded to it on the basis of the subjective right.5
The State’s obligation to protect human rights has a dual nature based on the general 
framework provided by human rights regulations. On the one hand, the state protects the 
human rights guaranteed to individuals (legal subjects), whilst on the other hand, in certain 
cases – with respect to specific human rights – it ensures the conditions necessary for the 
exercise of human rights (institutional protection). The institutional protection of a certain 
human right may provide a justification for restricting another. According to Zsolt Balogh:
[T]he state, acting within the framework of its obligation of institutional protection 
attached to the fundamental right, may afford similar protection as that ensured by the 
given fundamental right as a subjective right … Hence, even if no rights are guaranteed 
to the individual on the grounds of the subjective right, the constitutional protection 
granted on the grounds of the fundamental right still holds.6
The quoted ‘first abortion decision’ was probably the most radical in recognising the 
institutional protection of rights. The decision did not recognise the right of the foetus to 
life, as it could not be inferred from the Constitution that a foetus is a human being and that 
as such it would be the subject of fundamental rights, it nevertheless defined the state’s 
obligation of institutional protection regarding the very same right. Hence, according to the 
5 Constitutional Court decision no 64/1991. (XII. 17.) AB, Statement of Reasons, s C.3.c).
6 Balogh (1999) 34.
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Constitutional Court, the right to life has an objective side, even if it lacks a subjective side. 
This approach was confirmed by the ‘second abortion decision’.7
The state’s obligation, according to the Constitutional Court to ensure institutional 
protection also holds with respect to freedom of opinion and the freedom of the press, 
which means that the State is required not only to guarantee the freedom of the expression 
of opinion to its citizens but also to ensure the appropriate functioning of democratic public 
opinion.8 Back in the 1990s, the Constitutional Court established the state’s obligation of 
institutional protection of fundamental rights in terms of the right to a clean and healthy 
environment,9 the freedom of conscience and religion10 and later in connection with the 
provision protecting human dignity in media regulation.11
This kind of positive state obligation can also be identified regarding artistic freedom 
as a fundamental right. The state has a responsibility and obligation to preserve its artistic 
heritage and to promote and facilitate the creation of new works of art.
The state may support art and can also enter the art market as a buyer. In doing so, 
it will be forced, by necessity, to make some value judgements. It will promote certain 
artists via the institutional system established for that purpose, whereas it will neglect others 
and it will decide which works should be purchased for public collections. Hence, by 
spending money, the state expresses a certain opinion. Money can be considered here as a 
special from of ‘expression’ and not only in this context. For instance, the sponsorship of 
the campaigns of certain political candidates during an election can similarly be considered 
as an ‘expression’.12 If, during the early 1970s the Hungarian State had not purchased the 
Csontváry estate from Professor Gerlóczy, saved by him under adventurous circumstances, 
the paintings would probably have been lost for good. The state (and hence the audience) 
would have been one great collection poorer. This decision by the state also represented a 
clear value choice, made despite art critics and art historians not having a high opinion of 
Csontváry during his life and for a long time after his death.
In order to promote the arts, the Hungarian State maintains a complex network of 
institutions composed of numerous elements, thereby fulfilling its obligation of objective 
institutional protection. The state established the Hungarian Academy of Arts, also 
mentioned in the Fundamental Law, operating as an independent public body, in order to 
(according to the preamble of the respective Act) ‘protect and increase cultural values, 
to protect art and historical traditions, to strengthen the high quality community environment 
of artistic creation and to protect the freedom of artistic creation in order to honour the 
remarkable achievements of the representatives of Hungarian artistic life’.13 It also 
  7 Constitutional Court decision no 48/1998. (XI. 23.) AB.
  8 Constitutional Court decision no 30/1992. (V. 26.) AB, Statement of Reasons, s III.2.2; 
Constitutional Court decision no 37/1992. (VI. 10.) AB, Statement of Reasons, s II.2.a).
  9 Constitutional Court decision no 28/1994. (V. 20.) AB, Statement of Reasons, s III.3.
10 Constitutional Court decision no 4/1993. (II. 12.) AB, Statement of Reasons, s A)I.2.b); 
Constitutional Court decision no 22/1997 (VI. 25.) AB, Statement of Reasons, s III.1.4.
11 Constitutional Court decision no 46/2007. (V. 27.) AB, Statement of Reasons, s V.2; 
Constitutional Court decision no 165/2011. (V. 20.) AB, Statement of Reasons, s IV.2.2.2.
12 As for the practice applied in the United States, see e.g. Buckley v Valeo 424 US 1 (1976), 
more recently: Citizens United v Federal Election Commission 558 US 310 (2010). Of the decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights, see Bowman v the United Kingdom, case no 
141/1996/760/961, judgement of 19 February 1998.
13 Act CIX of 2011 on the Hungarian Academy of Arts.
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established the National Cultural Fund of Hungary in order to support artistic and literary 
works,14 the Hungarian National Film Fund to promote cinematographic works15 and the 
Hungarian Media Patronage Programme.16 The state maintains or recognises institutions of 
higher education providing education in the arts17 while protecting works of art and cultural 
assets created in the past,18 and separately provides for the legal status of performing 
artists.19
The establishment of this institutional system necessitates that certain value choices be 
made and its continuous operation requires day-to-day value judgements, wherein the state 
has the opportunity to enforce the criteria by which it wishes to spend finite, available 
resources assigned for that purpose. It is the obligation of the State under the Constitution 
to establish this independent institutional framework. This also highlighted by Constitutional 
Court decision no 51/2007. (IX. 15.) AB, made in connection with a minor issue, namely 
the social security and social support related status of artists: ‘Artistic creation, due to its 
inherent nature, has always demanded a special legal framework, since this activity can 
hardly be fitted into the group of other work-related legal relationships. Hence, the special 
characteristics of this activity had to be taken into account, in particular in the course of 
shaping and operating the social care system.’20
3.2.2. State Neutrality and Pluralism
Government bodies cannot act in a value-neutral manner in their decisions related to the 
arts, since such a requirement would make it impossible to operate a system dedicated to 
protecting the institutions. However, this remains a very sensitive issue. It should be 
avoided at all costs that the State or any of its bodies should force the value choices they 
were required to make onto its citizens. The principle of state neutrality thus does not 
narrow the state’s latitude in making decisions assigned to its competence, as these issues 
have to be decided on in any case, rather it imposes an obligation on the State to refrain 
from interference in the relationship between the state and its citizens.
The constitutional principle of neutrality, which was first reinforced in connection with 
religious beliefs, means that the state must recognise different ideologies and value 
judgements as equal.21 However, the principle of neutrality can only be maintained while it 
ensures that everyone has the right to choose freely from the views and ideologies available 
to them and so the state is not allowed to apply any coercion to anyone in their decision-
making. Even so, the state can never become completely independent and so the principle 
does not require the state to be indifferent. The Constitutional Court states ‘the fact that the 
state itself is neutral does not imply a negative freedom of religion and still less the 
promotion of religious indifference’.22 The requirement of pluralism does not mean that the 
14 Act XXIII of 1993 on the National Cultural Fund of Hungary.
15 Act II of 2004 on Motion Pictures.
16 Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media. See Kollarik and Vincze (2016) 
53−76.
17 Act CCVI of 2011 on National Higher Education.
18 Act LXIV of 2001 on the Protection of Cultural Heritage.
19 Act XCIX of 2008 on the Support and Special Employment Rules of Performing Arts 
Organisations.
20 Statement of Reasons, s III.1. 
21 On this matter, see Kis (1997).
22 Constitutional Court decision no 4/1993. (II. 12.) AB, Statement of Reasons, s I.1.c).
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state is not allowed to define priorities based on ideological grounds but rather that it cannot 
demand exclusivity and cannot say that only the ideologies and value judgements preferred 
by it are correct.
An individual is not born into a vacuum, without any recognised values. The cultural 
environment surrounding the individual provides the possibility of a choice between values 
– enabling choice between the various alternatives is one of the key tasks of the state. It can 
be argued from among the various alternatives, that it is also the task of the state to support, 
with greater emphasis than the other possible choices, those alternatives that represent the 
characteristic values of its citizens.
Decisions on matters such as what days should be declared state holidays; what should 
be taught in schools or whether a Ministry of Culture should be established or not all 
involve value judgements and all are absolutely necessary and desirable.23 Libraries and art 
galleries should be worth maintaining even if only a few people were interested in them. 
Various items of value, deemed worthy of preservation on the basis of a public consensus 
reached in the past, require protection even if the given consensus no longer exists or is 
currently debated by many people.
The State neutrality principle also covers the State’s attitude to art. According to 
Constitutional Court decision no 18/2014. (V. 30.) AB:
As far as the freedom of artistic life is concerned, the State has an obligation of 
objective institutional protection which entails that ‘it shapes the legal and 
organisational conditions required to ensure the individual fundamental rights by 
simultaneously taking into account all of its other related fundamental rights and 
constitutional duties. It shall ensure the most favourable enforcement of the individual 
rights, always with a view to the whole system and it thereby promotes harmony 
between the fundamental rights as well.’ (Constitutional Court decision no 64/1991. 
(XII. 17.) AB) The harmony between the fundamental rights can only be ensured by 
the State’s neutrality in matters related to the arts – the State must allow and guarantee 
the diversity of artistic creation, without granting exclusivity to a single trend or 
approach.24
However, as already noted above, this obligation is not incompatible with the decisions 
that need to be made in order to allocate state funds or perform other state duties. The issue 
of statues erected in public areas is an example of these decisions. Hungary has a long 
tradition of wars waged over the politics of memory in connection with statues.25 
Nevertheless, it is beyond dispute that in any constitutional system it is ultimately the state 
or, more frequently, the competent municipality that can make the decision on the erection 
or demolition of a statue in a public area.
While recognising their right to make necessary value judgements, government bodies 
must also respect the principle of pluralism. The obligation of the state to contribute, via its 
institutional system, to the pluralism, diversity and variety of artistic life constitutes an 
important element of the obligation of the state to protect the institution of artistic freedom 
as a fundamental right. This is an obligation similar to that related to the pluralism of the 
23 Levinson (1998) 195−220.
24 Statement of Reasons, para 14. For the general evaluation of the decision, see Cseporán and 
Kocsis (2014).
25 For a unique overview of this matter, see Pótó (2003).
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media market (the marketplace of ideas).26 Upon completion of the review of the 
constitutionality of the Act establishing the Hungarian Academy of Arts, the Constitutional 
Court summed up the matters as follows:
[I]n order to meet the requirement laid down in paragraph (1) of Article X of the 
Fundamental Law, the Hungarian Academy of Arts, operating in the form of a public 
body, must afford due protection to the freedom and diversity of artistic creation and 
also to its different trends and tendencies, without violating the values of the 
Fundamental Law. This requirement must be respected by the legislator as well, in the 
course of  establishing the rules governing the membership structure and activities of 
the Hungarian Academy of Arts. Whereas the public body itself must reflect and 
promote the pluralism of artistic activities through its organisational structure and 
operation. The Hungarian Academy of Arts must ensure equal opportunities to artists 
in becoming members of the Hungarian Academy of Arts and, through this, it must 
also ensure that the artists are able to have some influence on artistic life.27 … Based 
on this, Article 7(2) of the Act on the Hungarian Academy of Arts, which stipulated 
that only the members of a specific civil society organisation could have become full 
members of the Hungarian Academy of Arts upon its establishment and on the Board 
having exclusive competence regarding the admission of future members, was not in 
full accord with the requirement of neutrality and pluralism aimed to ensure the 
freedom of artistic creation. This did not fully comply with the provisions of paragraphs 
(1) and (3) of Article X of the Fundamental Law.28
The state therefore has a multifaceted personality in terms of its relation to the arts. On 
the one hand, it is obliged to make certain value judgements, in the field of funding and 
purchases, whilst on the other hand, depending on its economic resources, it must make 
efforts to maintain a pluralistic artistic life and to increase diversity. This, in fact, is not an 
unresolvable contradiction. A well-functioning state can separate these two roles by having 
a properly designed institutional system equipped with decision-making rights delegated to 
different places and by resorting to expert assistance on a continuous basis.
3.3. Scope of Freedom of Arts as a Subjective Right
Is freedom of arts an independent right, with content separable from other fundamental 
rights? If it is considered that freedom of arts is included in a separate, independent Article 
of the Fundamental Law (and also in the former Constitution), it may be inferred that the 
legislator wished to define it as an independent right. However, art, as a social phenomenon, 
is worthy of independent protection for many reasons and hence to be defined specifically 
in constitutions, does not necessarily mean that artistic freedom is a broader freedom or that 
it has a different nature to the freedom of expression, which undoubtedly is an independent 
freedom, with a unique fundamental right content.
There are other reasons can also be listed to prove the independence of artistic freedom. 
Beyond the fundamentally textual argument that it appears separately in the Fundamental 
Law, Art is clearly of great importance and not only in terms of its capacity to ensure the 
26 Constitutional Court decision no 37/1992. (VI. 10.) AB.
27 Constitutional Court decision no 18/2014. (V. 30.) AB, Statement of Reasons, para 16.
28 Constitutional Court decision no 18/2014. (V. 30.) AB, Statement of Reasons, para 22.
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self-expression of individuals but also in the interest of society as a whole. Enjoying art is 
not merely an intellectual entertainment or a pleasant pastime but greatly contributes to the 
development of an individual’s intellectual potential and of their views on various important 
questions of life. All this ultimately enriches the community.
Some argue that freedom of speech should never be limited in the case of artistic 
expression and therefore they do not accept such a limitation, even for the sake of protecting 
public morals, ‘artistic freedom excludes, by definition, its assessment from the viewpoint 
of public morals’.29 A textbook on fundamental rights argues that although artistic freedom 
is not unrestrictable, ‘science and art, as means of self-expression, are the freest fields of the 
right to free expression’30 and hence ‘in certain cases these are afforded a protection broader 
than that of the general freedom of expression’.31
Those representing these standpoints do not systematically attempt to separate cases of 
the freedom of opinion and artistic freedom and as we will see later, jurisprudence has been 
developing in the opposite direction, ie the uniform judgement of the two rights.
A theoretician of artistic freedom as a fundamental right encounters the problem of 
having to define the concept of ‘art’ if they wish to lay the theoretical foundations 
of granting a specific protection to artistic freedom. For the lawyer, this is surely an 
impossible task and any such attempt is bound to be cumbersome and unnatural, producing 
a field of manoeuvre that is either suffocatingly narrow or unmanageably loose. This is 
because art is a much more complex, uncertain and permanently changing phenomenon 
without any social context, rather than letting itself be shackled by legal concepts (and 
fortunately so). In addition, any (legal or non-legal) definition would need to have an 
element of aesthetic assessment and putting lawyers in charge of assessing the aesthetic 
value of works of art is to be avoided at all costs, even if it is limited to drawing the 
distinction between what qualifies as art and what does not.32 Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
the legendary judge of the US Supreme Court stated at the beginning of the twentieth 
century that ‘It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits.’33 Fortunately, the law currently stops where natural 
laws, ie the specificities of the regulated phenomenon, make it stop. Not even copyright law 
defines the concepts of ‘science, literature and art’ but requires the piece to be ‘unique, 
original’ for its author to be granted protection.34
The definition of art is therefore uncertain from a legal perspective. If the author of a 
given work of art or literary work considers their work to be art or literature, this 
consideration cannot be challenged, questioned or disputed in a legal sense. If the 
‘individual, original’ character of the creative product considered as a work of art is missing 
then that shall exclude protection by copyright, but it does not constitute a clear, legal 
statement or position meaning that the creative product ‘does not qualify as art’. It is a 
question, for example, whether the famous urinal by Marcel Duchamp had any individual, 
original character in the eyes of his contemporaries. If a specific, more powerful protection 
was provided to works of art compared to the protection afforded to freedom of opinion, 
29 Halmai (1994) 273–74.
30 Zeller (2006) 592.
31 Zeller (2006) 600.
32 Sólyom (2007) 109.
33 Opinion of Justice Holmes, Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co 188 US 239, 251 (1903).
34 Act LXXVI of 1999 on Copyrights, Article 1(3).
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then given that in a legal procedure it is not possible to define art, practically any expression 
perceivable to the external world could qualify as ‘creation’ and ‘art’ and this could not be 
disputed by a third party and thus it could require immunity solely based on a decision of 
its creator and not based on its really distinct substantive or formal specifics, because, in the 
absence of a definition, these aspects cannot be judged in a legal procedure.
Going beyond the difficulties in defining art it may nevertheless be worth attempting to 
identify the potential content of artistic freedom. According to the decision of the 
Constitutional Court referred to earlier, dated 1996, ‘the freedom of artistic life, as a 
fundamental right, also includes the freedom of artistic creative work and the self-expression 
of the artist, free from any illicit restriction, as well as the freedom to display, present and 
distribute works of art to the public’.35 Accordingly, the content of the right can be divided 
into two partial rights. In chronological order, the freedom of creation (self-expression) 
comes first and is followed by the freedom to make the finished work of art public 
(presentation, distribution).
It should be noted that the process up until the creation of the work of art is completed 
the birth of the idea, acquisition of necessary raw materials, the process of creation cannot 
be granted any specific legal protection. The right to ‘the freedom of thought’ can be used 
as an analogy as it is stipulated in various legal documents but which is without substantive 
real content related to a fundamental right. According to the Constitutional Court, freedom 
of thought also includes the freedom of conscience and the freedom of religion as specific, 
partly separate areas.36 However, the Constitutional Court does not mention this as a 
fundamental right derived from the mother right of the freedom of expression, as opposed 
to the other two rights.37 It would be difficult to attribute constitutional legal interpretation 
as only an already expressed, perceivable thought, ie exercising the right to freedom of 
opinion can be legally relevant.38 As such, the freedom of thought is merged with freedom 
of opinion and the freedom of conscience and religion, perhaps in certain cases with the 
protection of privacy. it is not justified to provide separate protection for it in constitutions 
and conventions. The same applies to ‘the first partial right’ of artistic freedom – the creator 
cannot be granted legal protection prior to the perceivable appearance of the work of art for 
practical reasons. The acquisition of the raw materials, tools and equipment required by the 
artist to produce the work of art is already granted protection through the general freedom 
of action of the artist (human dignity) so no specific separate constitutional protection is 
necessary for this purpose.
The second partial right, the right of presentation and distribution, is protected by the 
right to freedom of opinion. This is based on the previous arguments and is in line with the 
jurisprudence below so no individual fundamental legal character of this right can be 
identified.
3.4. Cases Pertaining to Freedom of Arts in the Hungarian Legal System
The scope of artistic freedom cannot be claimed to be in any way broader than the scope of 
the right to freedom of opinion based on legislation, jurisprudence and the related intentions 
of the Constitutional Court. If legal proceedings are launched in connection with a work of 
35 Constitutional Court decision no 24/1996. (VI. 25.) AB, Statement of Reasons, s II.1.
36 Constitutional Court decision no 4/1993. (II. 12.) AB, Statement of Reasons, s I.1.a).
37 Constitutional Court decision no 30/1992. (V. 26.) AB, Statement of Reasons, s III.2.1.
38 Constitutional Court decision no 4/1993. (II. 12.) AB, Statement of Reasons, s I.1.b).
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art or a piece of literature, the courts and constitutional courts will then define the boundaries 
of freedom in line with the principles and rules established pertaining to freedom of opinion. 
Artistic expression or literature do have specificities that might influence the decision but 
this only means that art, in the best case scenario, is treated as a sort of specific opinion, as 
the expression of opinion also has other specific, non-artistic forms, that is, artistic freedom 
is not ab ovo more wide-ranging than freedom of opinion. Where the limitation of freedom 
is a firm and more or less prompt response of the law, e.g. the punishment of a graffiti artist 
for wilful damage or a ban on child pornography, arguments based on artistic values are not 
very promising in a legal procedure.
3.4.1. Protection of Reputation and Honour
A film called Elment az Őszöd puts the figure of Ferenc Gyurcsány, the previous Prime 
Minister into a context which is fictitious but based on reality. In the film, after the 
memorable events of the Autumn of 2006, the demonstrations and riots organised after 
the Prime Minister’s ‘Őszöd speech’, Gyurcsány is sentenced by a court and is seen in 
handcuffs in one of the scenes. The former Prime Minister complained that his human 
dignity, honour and good reputation had been damaged because the film expressed 
unfounded facts and an offensive opinion of him. The claim was rejected by the court 
of first instance and the Budapest Court of Appeal also rejected his appeal under 
BDT2015.3326.
The court ruled that processing facts through the means of cinematography requires a 
specific judgement – a feature film will necessarily contain fictitious elements:
[I]t is clear to the understanding analyst and the average viewer that the defendant did 
not process the events with the purpose of fact-finding in a chronological order with 
historical loyalty to reality but created a new, fictitious story suspending real 
chronology and deviating from the real story-line. For this purpose and for this story-
line, they also made use of the real figure of the plaintiff as played by an actor. Due to 
the specificities of the genre created by the defendant, the artist cannot be held liable 
for developing the story line format variance with reality.
However, an opinion on public life may also be expressed using the tools of fiction:
Based on the film, it can be undisputedly established that the defendant, as an artist, is 
of the opinion that the criminal liability of the plaintiff may at least be considered due 
to the events of recent history. This is the essential message of the film. The defendant 
cannot be deprived of such a view because that would constitute the restriction of 
artistic freedom.
In summary:
The defendant depicted the options to examine the liability of the plaintiff related to 
certain events and, by doing so, they expressed their opinion concerning the real 
activities carried out by the plaintiff in public life. In the course of expressing their 
opinion, the defendant did not expose the plaintiff to unjustified humiliation in a way 
that damaged theirs human dignity. The activities of the defendant are granted 
protection by the Fundamental Law and they did not damage the rights relating to the 
personality of the plaintiff.
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It should be noted that a work of art containing fictitious elements might violate 
personality rights, if the character can be identified with a real person, ie the reason the 
Court rejected the appeal was not based on the premises that a fictitious work of art ab ovo 
cannot violate law but because the expression of an opinion on public life as depicted in the 
film did not go beyond the boundaries of freedom of expression as regards the exposure of 
public figures to criticism. This is referred to by the ratio decidendi in the header of the 
judgment – ‘Freedom of expression based on the opportunities of artistic freedom, if it is 
not autotelic and does not expose the person concerned to unjustified humiliation and does 
not damage their human dignity, is an act protected by the Fundamental Law, where it does 
not cause any violation of the right relating to personality.’ The decision clearly refers to the 
tests that opinions on public figures need to be subjected to, with respect to the right to 
honour and the protection of human dignity (‘unjustified humiliation’ or the challenge to 
‘human dignity’). Had it been justified by a higher tolerance threshold for public figures, 
the opinion expressed in the film might have been adjudged to be subject to restriction.39 
The lawsuit and the judgement in the lawsuit brought after the publication of Sándor 
Márai’s Egy polgár vallomásai, considered the author’s main achievement, is a literary 
example of the violation of personality rights by fiction.40
3.4.2. Abuse of the Right to One’s Own Image
In a case heard by the Hungarian Supreme Court (decision BH1994.127) caricatures similar 
to photo montages were published of Ágnes G Nagyné Maczó, a member of Parliament in 
showing the head of the plaintiff was on another person’s body. The magazine wanted to 
emphasise the powerful, aggressive character of the politician by putting an image of her 
head on the torso of a body-builder in a swimsuit. The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff 
should be paid damages because the form of depiction ‘is offensive to the plaintiff in terms 
of offending her as a woman and damaging her human dignity’. Later, another political 
caricature was considered by the court to be a lawful expression of opinion (BH2000.293): 
A photograph taken of a public figure and qualified as a caricature does not violate the right 
to one’s own image and an opinion expressed in this way does not violate honour or human 
dignity if it is not unjustifiably harmful, offensive or degrading. The courts considered these 
cases as questions relating to the freedom of expression and on this basis judged the 
lawfulness of the opinion, according to the prevailing practices at the time of the decision. 
Today, the case of Mrs G Nagyné would probably be decided in favour of the magazine 
based on the principles and practices relating to public figures, which have by now become 
well established.
3.4.3. Prohibited Totalitarian Symbols
Reading the passage of law on the criminal offence termed ‘usage of totalitarian symbols,’ 
the impression may be formed that at a certain point, the Hungarian legal regime directly 
recognised the unique status of artistic expression. Article 269/B of the previous Criminal 
Code (Act IV of 1978) and Article 335(2) of the new Criminal Code (Act C of 2012), 
which have the same content, stipulated that any person who uses the symbols proscribed in 
the legislation ‘for the purposes of the dissemination of knowledge, education, science or 
39 For more details on the tests, see Koltay (2014) 309−82.
40 Fischer and Sarusi Kiss (2003) 545−80.
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art, or with the purpose of information on events of history or the present time shall not be 
liable to punishment’. However, it is apparent that the ‘artistic purpose’ is only applied in 
certain privileged cases and, due to the character of the punishable act, the legislator rightly 
decided to exempt certain ways of usage from the ban. In addition to art, these include the 
use of banned symbols for the purposes of the dissemination of knowledge, education or 
information, ie every communication or creation where, for various reasons, it is justified to 
leave the opportunity to use symbols of despotism open. The work of art here is again 
‘only’ one of the opinions to be judged specifically and it does not enjoy ab ovo a broader 
scope of protection than other opinions do but rather has to be judged in the same way as 
other opinions which are of outstanding importance for society (for the purpose of 
disseminating knowledge, science, education or information). This statement is also 
emphasised by the currently effective text of the Criminal Code, which was developed as a 
result of Constitutional Court Decision 4/2013. (II. 21.) AB repealing the original provision, 
which no longer mentions privileged opinions, but which includes the notion of ‘capable of 
disturbing public order’ to describe the use of symbols of despotism as a condition for 
criminal liability. From this, it is clear that the specific opinions referred to in the previous 
paragraph (2) – including works of art – will continue to be exempt as they are not capable 
of disturbing public order.
3.4.4. The Protection of National Symbols
Article 334 of the new Criminal Code, similarly to Article 269/A. of the previous one grants 
protection to Hungarian national symbols – ‘Any person who publicly uses an expression 
offending or denigrating the national anthem, the flag or the coat of arms of the Republic 
of Hungary or the Holy Crown, or insults them in any other way, unless a graver crime is 
realised, shall be liable to punishment for a misdemeanour by imprisonment of up to one 
year.’ Constitutional Court decision 13/2000. (V. 12.) AB discussed the constitutionality of 
this provision and rejected the motion to annul it; nevertheless as the statement of reasons 
stipulates:
[N]egative opinions and scientific views on the history, value and public law 
significance of symbols and scientific views, artistic expressions or the expression of 
criticism and the expression of proposals to change or ban them shall not reasonably 
fall under criminal sanctioning, but shall constitute parts of the constitutional freedom 
of opinion.41
Opinions, criticisms, scientific views and proposals are therefore to be granted 
protection in the same way as artistic expression is, in accordance with the general principles 
of freedom of opinion.
3.4.5. Summary
Legislation mostly remains silent on granting differentiated protection to artistic expression 
in a way that differs from the protection granted to the freedom of opinion and where it 
does/did expressly mention it, e.g. with respect to crime relating to the use of symbols of 
despotism, it was identified as one of several specific types of expression. The jurisprudence 
41 Constitutional Court decision no 13/2000. (V. 12.) AB, Statement of Reasons, s IV.6.
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of necessity encounters cases launched or triggered by works of art and pieces of literature 
but, without exception, it applies the relevant standards of freedom of opinion (established 
in the area of rights relating to personality or hate speech). Artistic expression is a specific 
form of expression of opinion and, for jurisprudence to be sound, it is important to take 
these specificities into account, e.g. a literary work or a film can be assumed to be fictitious 
and thus does not aim to depict or present reality and real facts, but this does not place 
works of art out of the context of freedom of opinion and their specificities due to their 
artistic nature does not exclude the application of certain restrictions on freedom of opinion 
as they are also specified pertaining to non-artistic opinions. In the same way, clearly non-
artistic opinions might have specificities to be taken into account when establishing the 
extent to which freedom should be granted, e.g. non-verbal communication in US legal 
terminology: cases of symbolic speech.42 The subjective aspect of artistic freedom is 
therefore adjusted to the scope of freedom of opinion.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The presented arguments can be briefly summarised as artistic freedom, as an independent 
fundamental right, does not exist and this does not present a problem at all. Certainly, the 
previous statement can only be accepted as true under some constraints. The subjective side 
of the artistic freedom in reality integrates into the fundamental right of freedom of opinion, 
ie artistic expression is free, but it does not require a separate, specific protection under the 
fundamental law. However, the specificities of artistic expression as factors influencing the 
scope of the freedom of opinion might be taken into account, e.g. symbolic speech, the 
specificities of a genre or the time elapsed since publication). Hence, works of art and 
literary pieces are to be treated as specific, unique opinions – they are presented as a form 
of freedom of opinion but this does not go beyond the boundaries of freedom of opinion as 
a fundamental right.
At the same time, the regulation of art, irrespective of this, might be justified even in 
the Fundamental Law. Setting requirements for the state (the objective obligation of the 
state to safeguard the institutions of fundamental law) is a precondition for the birth and 
preservation of works of art, which constitutes the objective side of artistic freedom without 
any specific subject and denotes its specific constitutional content (commitment on the part 
of the state to take decisions in cases pertaining to art, while considering the neutrality of 
the state and aiming to safeguard artistic pluralism). An interesting specificity of Hungarian 
constitutional development is that up until 1972, the text of the Constitution only reflected 
the latter aspect of artistic freedom, ie the institutional protection, of course narrowly 
formulated in line with the societal system and prevailing ideology of the era. Even after 
1972, the prescription of the responsibilities of the state was more clearly and explicitly 
stipulated in the Constitution than in the subjective side of law. Even today, it would not be 
outrageous for the Fundamental Law to contain only the objective aspect of artistic freedom, 
although as a matter of fact, the constitutional redundancy in the partial overlap between 
Articles IX and X, does not cause any problems of interpretation.
42 See e.g. Texas v Johnson 491 US 397 (1989) (burning of the American flag); RAV v St Paul 
505 US 377 (1992) (burning of the cross on private property); Virginia v Black 538 US 343 (2003) 
(burning of the cross in the backyard of a black family).
72 ANDRÁS KOLTAY
In literature grappling with laying down the theoretical foundation for artistic freedom, 
various requirements are set forth vis-a-vis the legal system. Generally speaking, these can 
be divided into two groups of expectations, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive: 
works of art should be granted at least the same constitutional protection as that of public 
opinion which enjoys the most powerful protection43 and the legal system should 
acknowledge the importance of art and artistic freedom in its own right; should not treat it 
as a specific category of public opinions and the law should draw the demarcation lines or 
the boundaries of its freedom based on its specific features.44 The first of these demands can 
be accepted without any reservation, but if this seems insufficient, we might as well consider 
how justified the second requirement is. However, the purpose of this paper is not to lay the 
theoretical foundations of artistic freedom (or to establish the impossibility of such a 
foundation) but to make an overview of the Hungarian legal system of how artistic freedom 
is exercised in practice as compared to the freedom of arts usually specifically referred to in 
constitutions. In practical experience, it can be claimed that certain elements of the second 
requirement have already become reality. Certain decisions have recognised the specificities 
of artistic expression (satire, fiction, etc.), or the significance of the way that works of art 
are received by the audience, e.g. the time elapsed since their publication and the reception 
and assessment of the work of art by the audience. Art is treated as a sort of specific way of 
expressing opinion and thus its specificities may be taken into account, as is done in other 
specific ways of expressing opinions, but the legal judgement of a work of art in all cases 
remains within the law pertaining to freedom of opinion. The necessary weighing up of 
colliding rights and conflicting interests needs to be done in that context and the scope or 
coverage of this freedom can be established on this basis. This should not come as 
disappointment, because this does not mean at all that art is degraded by the law but on the 
contrary, the nearly instinctive reluctance of modern law on freedom of expression to draw 
a separate demarcation line for art may only be beneficial for artists, works of art and 
audiences alike.
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